Pedagogical second-order λ-calculus  by Colson, Loïc & Michel, David
Theoretical Computer Science 410 (2009) 4190–4203
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Theoretical Computer Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs
Pedagogical second-order λ-calculus
Loïc Colson, David Michel ∗
L.I.T.A, University of Metz, France
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 26 June 2007
Received in revised form 26 November
2008
Accepted 24 April 2009
Communicated by A. Avron
Keywords:
Typed λ-calculus
Natural deduction
Mathematical logic
Negationless mathematics
Constructive mathematics
a b s t r a c t
The presentwork introduces the notion of pedagogical natural deduction systems, i.e. natural
deduction systems for which hypotheses occurring in a proof must be motivated by an
example. In formal terms, we replace the rule (Hyp):
F ∈ Γ
Γ ` F (Hyp)
by the rule (P-Hyp):
F ∈ Γ ` σ · Γ
Γ ` F (P-Hyp)
where σ denotes a substitution which replaces all variables of Γ with an example. This
substitution is called themotivation of Γ . These systems are in essence negationless. In the
present paper, we study second order propositional calculus, since it is a simple non-trivial
natural deduction system in which negation can be defined. We present a Curry–Howard
version of pedagogical second-order propositional calculus, i.e. λ-calculus bearing the
pedagogical constraint. We establish that this system has the usual properties of typed
calculi (subject reduction and strong normalization) and that it can type all second-order
terms of λµ-calculus using a CPS translation. Furthermore, the main novelty is that all
functions are useful: each polymorphic function has an instance which can be applied to
a closed term.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction1
It is a common observation in the field of mathematics education that the act of providing examples of mathematical
objects satisfying a definition is advantageous for its comprehension. This observation had already been pointed out in the
philosophy of mathematics: for instance H. Poincaré suggested in [23] that all definitions should be immediately followed
by an example. Despite this state of affairs, usual formal systems used in the foundations of Mathematics, like Hilbert-style
systems and those based on sequent calculus or natural deduction systems, systematically disregard this dictum of Poincaré.
G. F. C. Griss proposed in [9] that mathematics should be developed without using negation. He argued that mathematical
notions should be limited to those based on mathematical constructionsă: if the construction is impossible, then the notion
does not make sense. Unfortunately, his philosophical and scientific motivations did not go beyond theoretical reflections,
as, for him, negationless mathematics can be studied as a purely mathematical problem.
Proof by contradiction does not usually carry insightful information on the manipulated mathematical notions, since
absurd formulae do not represent any sensible constructible object. As a consequence, intuitionistic proofs usually demand
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 0 3 87 31 53 09.
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additional constructions. From thesemore stringent conditions, a finer understanding ofmathematical objectswas obtained.
We may suppose that negationless mathematics can give similar benefits. As an example (see [9], page 678), Griss replaces
inequality (i.e. we have t 6= u when we have ¬(t = u)), which requires a negation, with difference, a structural property on
objectsă: in arithmetics, t is different from u when there is a natural number d such that t = u + d + 1 or u = t + d + 1.
Thus, it is more precise than inequality because we construct an integer which distinguishes between the two objects and
thus provides more information.
The present article is an attempt to introduce formal systems fulfilling the Poincarean point of view by including what
we call the pedagogical constraint. We start with natural deduction systems as introduced by Gentzen [6] and Prawitz [24].
They manipulate judgements like Γ ` F , where Γ is a finite set {G1, . . . ,Gn} of formulae and F a formula, with the intuitive
understanding that F holds if all formulae in Γ do as well. In such systems, there is usually no built-in mechanism for
manipulating definitions. Instead, in order to introduce an object x satisfying given definitions, we assume in the context Γ
some formulae where the variable x occurs; this variable may be of any kind, depending on the nature of the defined object.
It is observed that the main rule in a system creating the context Γ is the hypothesis rule:
F ∈ Γ
Γ ` F (Hyp).
Note that in this rule the only requirement on Γ is that it is a set of formulae, possibly non-motivated or even contradictory.
The pedagogical constraint will thus be the following: we require that at least one instance σ · Γ of Γ is provable, i.e. that
` σ ·G1 · · · ` σ ·Gn can be derived for a substitution replacing any variable of Γ with an example, here denoted as σ . Thus,
the hypothesis rule becomes the pedagogical hypothesis rule:
F ∈ Γ ` σ · Γ
Γ ` F (P-Hyp).
Pedagogical constraint has important consequences on reasoning: for instance, reasoning by contradiction is not possible.
In order to prove F , assuming ¬F and deriving a contradiction, one must first assume ¬F , which is not possible pedagog-
ically as there is no example σ so that ` σ · ¬F . Then, we see that pedagogical natural deduction systems are naturally
intuitionistic systems. More radically, proving a negative statement like¬F , that is F →⊥, is not possible as we would have
to assume F and derive ⊥. But we cannot assume F , since we cannot have any example σ such that ` σ · F . Reasoning
pedagogically is not only intuitionistic, but also positive, i.e. exempt of any form of negation. Note that there are formulae
(like ∀α∀β.α ∨ (α → β)) which do not allow any provable instance, although they are negationless. Hence, we have to
distinguish pedagogical systems and negationless systems.
In a previous paper [2], we studied the pedagogical version of first order propositional calculus on implication,
conjunction and disjunction. We proved that it is equivalent to the usual calculus (i.e. not pedagogical). In the present
paper, we study second-order propositional calculus, since it is the simplest non-trivial natural deduction system in which
negation can be defined. We present a Curry–Howard version of pedagogical second-order propositional calculus [3]
(typed λ-calculus). We establish that this system has the usual properties of typed calculi (subject reduction and strong
normalization). Furthermore, the main novelty is that all functions (i.e. terms t of this calculus of type A → B) are useful:
there is an instance σ · t : (σ · A)→ (σ · B) of t : A→ B such that σ · A is inhabited. Consequently, there is a closed term of
type σ · A to which σ · t can be applied. This is in sharp contrast with usual second-order calculus, in which one can define
a function of type (∀α.α) → (∀α.α). It is well known that the type ∀α.α is not inhabited: there is no closed term of type
∀α.α. Finally, we will study the expressive power of pedagogical λ-calculus using a continuation passing style translation.
2. Related work
G.F.C. Griss gave in [9–11] and [12] an informal development of a few parts of negationless mathematics. Attempts
to formalize these ideas have been effected by Vredenduin [26], Gilmore [7], Valpola [25], Nelson [19], [20] and Krivtsov
[15,16]. Mezhlumbekova has presented in [17] a translation of Heyting arithmetic into a weak system of negationless
arithmetic. These works mostly deal with first-order logic and its extensions. Heyting wrote in [13], page 122, that ‘‘First
of all, there is no calculus of propositions, because only true propositions make sense’’. As a matter of fact, there exists no
study of pure propositional logic. Moreover, they introduce quite sophisticated formal systems, with technicalities such as
quantified operators in [19], or Krivtsov’s pairs of derivations in [15].These authors have pointed out their complexity, which
creates serious difficulties in the study of their systems with standard proof-theoretical methods. Moreover, none of these
formalizations represents a functional system (i.e. a λ-calculus). Our proposal allows to avoid all difficult technicalities and
gives a simple account of related ideas. We only use usual logical connectives and we introduce negationless logic as a
natural deduction system, so that we can apply Curry–Howard isomorphism.
3. Second order propositional calculus (Prop2)
3.1. Presentation
We start with a brief description of Prop2, the usual intuitionistic second-order propositional calculus.
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Definition 1. formulae, that we also call types, are defined inductively as follows:
• the true formula> is a formula;
• propositional variables α, β, γ , . . . are formulae;
• if A and B are formulae then A→ B is a formula;
• if α is a propositional variable and A is a formula then ∀α.A is a formula.
The set of all formulae is denoted as F , while the set of free variables of a formula F is denoted as Fv(F). For the sake of
simplicity, we will write A → B → C for formulae of the form A → (B → C), and ∀α.A → B for those denoted as
∀α.(A→ B).
The presence of the constant>denoting true formulamay appear unnecessary. Indeed, all provable formulae like∀α.α→ α
can be identified with >. We will see why the constant > must be used when pedagogical second-order propositional
calculus is formally defined. For the moment, we justify its presence by the fact that we do not have any atomic formula like
0 = 0 in arithmetic.
Definition 2. terms are defined inductively as follows:
• o is a term;
• term variables x, y, z, . . . are terms;
• if x is a term variable, A is a formula and t is a term then λxA.t is a term;
• if α is a propositional variable and t is a term thenΛα.t is a term;
• if t and u are terms then tu is a term;
• if t is a term and U is a formula then then tU is a term.
The substitution of formulae B1, . . . , Bn for variables α1, . . . , αn in a formula A can be defined as usual by induction on A.
Such a substitution will often be written σ , and its effect on A σ · A. Care must be taken in case σ is applied to ∀α.A: the
resulting formula is ∀α.σ ·A, butαmust be renamed ifα is in the domain of σ or ifα is a free variable in some of the formulae
B1, . . . , Bn. Similarly, we define the substitution of formulae B1, . . . , Bn for variables α1, . . . , αn in a term t: substitution acts
as usual on the formulae occurring in t . The application of such a substitution σ to the term t will also be denoted with dot
notation σ · t .
Definition 3.
• A statement is a couple (t, A)with t a term and A a variable, and will be written t : A.
• A declaration, or hypothesis, is a statement x : A in which x is a term variable.
• A context is a finite set of hypotheses Γ so that for all hypotheses x : A ∈ Γ and y : B ∈ Γ , if x = y then A = B.
We will write σ · Γ for the set of all hypotheses x : σ · F where x : F ∈ Γ . We will use the same notation for all functions
on formulae, while the expression Γ , x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An will be used for the context Γ ∪ {x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An}.
The syntax of Prop2 is given in natural deduction by the rules expressed in Ref. [8]. In these rules, a judgement Γ `2 t : A
signifies that the formula A holds under the context Γ , while t is the term coding the derivation. For the sake of simplicity,
terms will be omitted in judgements when they are not necessary: we will write that the judgement Γ `2 F is derivable
when there is a term t so that the judgement Γ `2 t : F is derivable.
Γ `2 o : >
(Ax)
Γ , x : A `2 x : A
(Hyp)
Γ , x : A `2 t : B
Γ `2 λxA.t : A→ B
(→i)
Γ `2 t : A→ B Γ `2 u : A
Γ `2 tu : B
(→e)
Γ `2 t : A α 6∈ Fv(Γ )
Γ `2 Λα.t : ∀α.A
(∀i)
Γ `2 t : ∀α.A
Γ `2 tU : [α← U] · A
(∀e)
The axiom rule, denoted as (Ax), is added to usual second-order propositional calculus in order to define the behavior of the
constant>. The only property of> is to be true, so it is naturally derivable without any premise and for arbitrary contexts.
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3.2. Negation and motivations
Prawitz stated in [24] that absurdity can be defined in Prop2 using the formula ∀α.α. Indeed, the judgement Γ `2
(∀α.α)→ F is derivable whatever Γ and F are:
(1) Γ , x : ∀α.α `2 x : ∀α.α by (Hyp)
(2) Γ , x : ∀α.α `2 xF : F by (∀e) and (1)
(3) Γ `2 λx∀α.α.xF : (∀α.α)→ F by (→i) and (2)
Thus, the elimination rule for absurdity, which is written (⊥e), is derivable in Prop2:
Γ `2 t : ∀α.α
Γ `2 tF : F
(⊥e).
Let us denoted⊥ for ∀α.α. Negation is defined using⊥ and implication:
Definition 4. For all formulae F , negation of F , written as ¬F , is defined by the formula F →⊥.
In a pedagogical system, all hypotheses are motivable. Intuitively, a motivation is an example of mathematical object
defined in hypotheses. Formally, a motivation is a substitution with variables in the hypothesis formulae. We will now
define notations and functions on substitutions.
Definition 5.
• The domain of a substitution σ is the set of the variables α so that each formula σ · α is defined, and it is written Dσ .• The set of the free variables of a substitution σ , denoted as Fv(σ ), is the union of all the sets Fv(σ · α)with α ∈ Dσ .• For all substitutions σ and any setW ⊆ Dσ , σ|W is by definition the substitution σ restricted to the domainW .• For all variablesα1, . . . , αn and all formulae A1, . . . , An, the substitutionwhich associates the formula Aiwith the variable
αi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is written [α1 ← A1; . . . ;αn ← An].• If σ1, . . . , σn are substitutions with mutually disjoint domains, [σ1; . . . ; σn] is the substitution which associates the
formula σi · α with a variable α when α ∈ Dσi .• For all substitutions µ and σ , the substitution µ · σ is the substitution of domain Dσ so that for all α ∈ Dσ we have
(µ · σ) · α = µ · (σ · α). In order to avoid ambiguities, substitution applications of the form σ · (µ · F) will be denoted
as µ · σ · F .
The following standard technical lemma for defining the composition of two substitutions has to be stated:
Lemma 6. Let µ and σ be two substitutions and F be a formula. Let us write µ σ for the substitution [µ · σ ;µ|(Dµ\Dσ )]. Thus
µ · σ · F = µ σ · F .
Proof. We proceed by induction on F :
• F = >: µ · σ · > = > and> = µ σ · >;
• F = α: we have three cases:
– α ∈ Dσ : α 6∈ Dµ \ Dσ , so µ · σ · α = µ σ · α by definition of;
– α ∈ Dµ \ Dσ : α 6∈ Dσ , thus σ · α = α, µ · σ · α = µ · α and then µ · σ · α = µ σ · α by definition of;
– α 6∈ Dµ ∪ Dσ : µ · σ · α = α and Dµσ = Dµ ∪ Dσ , so µ σ · α = α and µ · σ · α = µ σ · α;• F = A → B: by induction hypothesis on A and B, we have µ · σ · A = µ  σ · A and µ · σ · B = µ  σ · B, thus
µ · σ · (A→ B) = µ σ · (A→ B);
• F = ∀α.A: by induction hypothesis on A, we have µ · σ · A = µ σ · A. As we can suppose α 6∈ Dµ ∪ Dσ and α 6∈ Fv(σ ),
µ · σ · (∀α.A) = ∀α.µ · σ · A and µ σ · (∀α.A) = ∀α.µ σ · A. Thus, µ · σ · (∀α.A) = µ σ · (∀α.A). 
We can now define formally what a motivation is:
Definition 7. Let us write ∆ for the context {x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An}. For a given notion of deduction, a motivation for ∆ is
any substitution σ such that the judgements ` σ · ∆ are derivable, where ` σ · ∆ is the collection of the judgements
` σ · A1, . . . ,` σ · An. An hypothesis x : F is motivable when the singleton set {x : F} is motivable.
We extend the notion of motivation to the sets of formulae. For that, we will say that a formula F is motivable when an
hypothesis x : F is motivable. In particular, the formula ⊥ is not motivable in Prop2 because it is closed and not provable.
This is a consequence of the consistency of Prop2. So Prop2 is trivially not pedagogical: the judgement ⊥ `2 ⊥ is easily
derivable but the formula⊥ is not motivable.
The formulae in the context σ · Γ can be closed or not. This leads to the notions of complete motivations and partial
motivations:
Definition 8. Amotivation σ for a context∆ is completewhen the formulae in σ ·∆ are closed. Amotivation is partialwhen
it is not complete.
A partial motivation corresponds to an abstract example, or a partially constructed example in which named objects remain
(i.e. free variables), which have not been constructed yet. A complete motivation corresponds to a concrete example, thus
fully constructed.
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4. Pedagogical second-order propositional calculus (P-Prop2)
4.1. Presentation
We will define pedagogical second-order propositional calculus (P-Prop2) as a restriction of Prop2 by constraining the
rules (Hyp), (Ax) and (∀e).
Firstly, we replace the rule (Hyp) of the usual system with the pedagogical rule (P-Hyp). In this pedagogical system, Γ `p F
will stand for the provability of F under hypotheses Γ .
x : F ∈ Γ `p σ · Γ
Γ `p x : F
(P-Hyp)
As a second step, we justify the introduction of the formula> and the rule (Ax). Indeed, without the rule (Ax), the obtained
system is empty: all its rules have at least one premise so that no derivation can be effected. (Ax), on the contrary, allows one
to derive the formula>, because we cannot derive an unspecified true formula with (Ax) without an a priori knowledge of
an eventual safe and pedagogical derivability of this true formula: at this level of the definition of P-Prop2, we do not even
knowwhat a pedagogically provable formula is. Moreover, wewill prove in sub-section 4.2 that there are provable formulae
in Prop2 not provable in P-Prop2.
Observe that the rule (Ax) is not pedagogical: introduced hypotheses are not motivated. We replace it with the rule (P-Ax):
`p σ · Γ
Γ `p o : >
(P-Ax)
When Γ is empty, the premises of the rule (P-Ax) are automatically fulfilled.
If we only constrain the rules (Hyp) and (Ax), we can construct the following derivation:
(1) `p o : > using (P-Ax)
(2) x : α `p x : α using (P-Hyp) and (1)
(3) `p λxα.x : α→ α using (→i) and (2)
(4) `p Λα.λxα.x : ∀α.α→ α using (∀i) and (3)
(5) `p (Λα.λxα.x)⊥ : ⊥ → ⊥ using (∀e) and (4)
but we cannot normalize this derivation because its normal form in Prop2 is not pedagogical:
(1) x : ⊥ `2 x : ⊥ using (Hyp)
(2) `2 λx⊥.x : ⊥ → ⊥ using (→i) and (1)
In the first step we need to put the formula⊥ in the context, but⊥ is not motivable. So these two derivations should not be
pedagogical. Thus, we have to replace the rule (∀e) by the rule (P-∀e):
Γ `p t : ∀α.A `p σ · U
Γ `p tU : [α← U] · A
(P-∀e).
We observe that the new sub-formula U must be motivated. Thus, all formulae introduced by the rules of P-Prop2 (i.e. the
formulae in the premises of the rules) share this property as well.
The following proposition states that we can always complete all partial motivations:
Proposition 9. Let µ be a motivable substitution, i.e. for all α ∈ Dµ, the formula µ · α is motivable. If σ is a motivation for F ,
then substitution µ σ is a motivation for F .
Proof. We proceed by induction on the cardinal of Fv(σ · F):
• Fv(σ · F) = ∅: `p µ σ · F is derivable because µ σ · F = σ · F ;• Fv(σ · F) = W unionsq {α}: we derive `p ∀α.σ · F with (∀i). By induction hypothesis, `p µ|W · ∀α.σ · F is derivable. We derive
`p µ σ · F with (P-∀e). 
In the previous lemma, we have obtained a complete motivation whenµ is the substitution which associates constant> to
all propositional variables.
4.2. Syntactical non-nullity of implications
In [19], Nelson has defined the notion of non-null implication: an implication A→ B is said to be null in case A is false in
all instances. A formal system in which null implications do not occur satisfies the non-nullity criterion on implications. The
non-nullity is a semantical notion, but it has a syntactical counterpart. An implication A → B is syntactically null in case A
is not motivable. P-Prop2 satisfies the syntactical non-nullity criterion on implications: we will prove that if the judgement
Γ `p F is derivable then all sub-formulae of the formulae in Γ ∪ {F} are motivable. Moreover, we will show in Theorem 19
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that we can motivate all motivable formulae with the substitution replacing all free variables with >. Thus, if A → B is a
sub-formula of the formulae in Γ ∪ {F}, then A is motivable and A → B is syntactically non-null. However, the notion of
motivation is not sufficient to prove Theorem 19. We need to introduce stronger notions for that:
Definition 10.
• a substitution σ is trivial if for all variables α ∈ Dσ the judgement `p σ · α is derivable;
• a formula F is trivially motivable (TM) if F is motivable with a trivial substitution;
• a formula F is hereditarily trivially motivable (HTM) if all the sub-formulae of F are TM;
• let τ be the substitution so that for all variable α, τ · α = >. For all formulae F , the formula τ · F is denoted as F>.
τ is a trivial substitution because the judgement `p > is derivable. Non-trivial substitution exists, such as [α ← β → γ ]:
the judgement `p β → γ is not derivable although [α← β → γ ] is a motivation for the formula α→ α.
Lemma 11. If σ and µ are two trivial substitutions, then σ  µ is a trivial substitution.
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 9. 
Lemma 12. For all derivable judgements Γ `p F and for all formulae U motivable by a substitutionµ, if none of the variables in
Fv(U) occurs in the formulae of the derivation of Γ `p F then Γ ,U `p F is derivable.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of Γ `p F . (P-Ax) and (P-Hyp) are the only non-immediate cases:
• `p σ · Γ
Γ `p >
(P-Ax): let us consider that Dσ ⊆ Fv(Γ ) and Dµ ⊆ Fv(U). We have Dσ ∩ Dµ = ∅ by hypothesis, so the
judgements `p [σ ;µ] · Γ and `p [σ ;µ] · U are derivable. Thus, we derive Γ ,U `p F with the (P-Ax) rule;
• F ∈ Γ `p σ · Γ
Γ `p F
(P-Hyp): similar to (P-Ax). 
Lemma 13. For all derivable judgement Γ `p F and for all formulae U such that Γ ∪ {U} is motivable, Γ ,U `p F is derivable.
Proof. We derive `p Γ → F with the rule (→i). Let us define a substitution µ which is a renaming of the variables in
Fv(Γ , F). This doing, we have a derivation of `p µ · (Γ → F) in which none of the variables in Fv(Γ ,U) occurs. Let
β1, . . . , βn be the values of the variables renamed by µ:
(1) Γ ,U `p µ · (Γ → F) from Lemma 12
(2) Γ ,U `p ∀β1, . . . , βn.µ · (Γ → F) from the rule (∀i) and (1)
(3) Γ ,U `p Γ → F from the rule (∀e) and (2)
(4) Γ ,U `p Γ from the rule (P-Hyp) and the motivation of Γ ∪ {U}
(5) Γ ,U `p F from the rule (→e) and (3) (4). 
Lemma 14. Let Γ ∪ {F} be a set of HTM formulae. For all trivial substitutions σ and µ such that Dσ = Dµ, if Γ `p σ · F is
derivable then Γ `p µ · F is derivable.
Proof. We proceed by induction on F :
• F = >: suppose that Γ `p σ · > is derivable. Then, σ · > = > and> = µ · >, so Γ `p σ · > is derivable;
• F = α: σ andµ are two trivial substitutions, so that`p σ ·α and`p µ ·α are derivable. Γ is motivable, so that Γ `p σ ·α
and Γ `p µ · α can be shown to be derivable with successive applications of the Lemma 13;
• F = A→ B: let us suppose that Γ `p σ · (A→ B) is derivable. A is HTM, hence there is a trivial substitution ρ so that
the judgement `p ρ · A is derivable. According to Proposition 9, τ  ρ is a motivation for A. ρ is a trivial substitution,
consequently, using Lemma 11, τ  ρ is a trivial substitution. Let pi denote a trivial motivation for Γ . Similarly, τ  pi is
a trivial substitution for Γ . (τ  pi)µ is a trivial substitution according to Lemma 11, so that by induction, hypothesis
`p (τ  pi)  µ · A is derivable. Since τ  pi is a motivation for Γ ∪ {µ · A}, we derive Γ , µ · A `p σ · (A → B) with
Lemma 13. We derive Γ , µ · A `p µ · Awith the rule (P-Hyp). By induction hypothesis, Γ , µ · A `p σ · A is derivable. As
a consequence, we derive Γ , µ · A `p σ · B with the rule (→e). By induction hypothesis, Γ , µ · A `p µ · B is derivable.
Finally, we derive Γ `p µ · (A→ B)with the rule (→i);
• F = ∀α.A: let us suppose thatΓ `p σ ·∀α.A is derivable. Aswe can assume thatα 6∈ Dσ andα 6∈ Fv(σ ),σ ·∀α.A = ∀α.σ ·A.
We derive Γ `p σ · A with the rule (P-∀e). By induction hypothesis, Γ `p µ · A is derivable. We derive Γ `p ∀α.µ · A
with the rule (∀i). As we can suppose α 6∈ Dµ and α 6∈ Fv(µ), µ · ∀α.A = ∀α.µ · A. Thus, Γ `p µ · ∀α.A is derivable. 
Lemma 15. Let F be a formula and σ be a substitution. If σ · F is HTM then F is HTM.
Proof. Let σ ′ = σ|Dσ∩Fv(F); hence, we have σ · F = σ ′ · F . Let G be a sub-formula of F . σ ′ · G is a sub-formula of σ ′ · F so
σ ′ · G is HTM: there is a trivial substitution ρ verifying `p ρ  σ ′ · G to be derivable. Using Lemma 14, `p τ|Dρ  σ ′ · G is
derivable. `p τ  σ ′ · G is derivable from Proposition 9. Similarly, we prove for all variables α ∈ Dσ ′ that `p τ  σ ′ · α is
derivable. Thus, τ  σ ′ is a trivial substitution. According to Lemma 14, `p τ · G is derivable, and then G is TM. 
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Lemma 16. For all HTM formulae U and F , and for all variable α, the formula [α← U] · F is HTM.
Proof. Let H be a sub-formula of [α← U] · F . There are two cases:
• H is a sub-formula of U: U is HTM, consequently H is TM;
• there is a sub-formula G of F so that H = [α ← U] · G: U is HTM; hence there is a trivial substitution ρ so that `p ρ · U
is derivable. Using Lemma 14, `p τ|Dρ · U is derivable. By Proposition 9, `p U> is derivable. Similarly `p G> is derivable.
Let µ = [α ← U>; τ|Fv(G)\{α}]. µ is a trivial substitution of domain Fv(G), so `p µ · G is derivable from Lemma 14. As
µ · G = ([α← U] · G)>, we have a derivation of ([α← U] · G)>. Thus, [α← U] · G is TM. 
Lemma 17. For all derivable judgements Γ `p F and for all trivial substitutions σ , if the judgements`p σ ·Γ are derivable, then
`p σ · F is derivable.
Proof. Let Γ = {F1, . . . , Fn} and Dσ = {α1, . . . , αm}. We derive `p F1 → · · · → Fn → F by successive applications of
(→i). We obtain similarly `p ∀α1 . . . ∀αm.F1 → · · · → Fn → F , `p σ · F1 → · · · → σ · Fn → σ · F and `p σ · F using
respectively (∀i), (P-∀e) and (→e). One has considered σ as trivial to derive the last implication. 
Proposition 18. For all derivable judgements Γ `p F , all formulae in Γ ∪ {F} are HTM.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of Γ `p F :
• `p σ · Γ
Γ `p >
(P-Ax): Let F ′ ∈ Γ . By induction hypothesis, σ · F ′ is HTM. According to Lemma 15, F ′ is HTM. Thus all the
formulae in Γ ∪ {>} are HTM;
• F ∈ Γ `p σ · Γ
Γ `p F
(P-Hyp): similar to the case of the (P-Ax) rule;
• Γ , A `p B
Γ `p A→ B
(→i): by induction hypothesis, the formulae in Γ ∪ {A, B} are HTM. A → B is TM according to
Proposition 17;
• Γ `p A→ B Γ `p A
Γ `p B
(→e): by induction hypothesis, the formulae in Γ ∪ {A, B} are HTM;
• Γ `p A α 6∈ Fv(Γ )
Γ `p ∀α.A
(∀i): similar to the case of the (→i) rule;
• Γ `p ∀α.A `p σ · U
Γ `p [α← U] · A
(P-∀e): by the induction hypothesis, σ · U is HTM. According to Lemma 15, U is HTM. By the
induction hypothesis, the formulae in Γ ∪ {A} are HTM. Thus, [α← U] · A is HTM from Lemma 16. 
Theorem 19. For all derivable judgement Γ `p F , `p G> judgements are derivable for all sub-formulae G of the formulae
belonging to Γ ∪ {F}.
Proof. LetG be a sub-formula of a formula inΓ ∪{F}. According to the Proposition 18,G is HTM: there is a trivial substitution
σ such that `p σ · G is derivable. By Lemma 14, `p τ|Dσ · G is derivable. By Proposition 9, `p τ · G is derivable. Thus, `p G>
is derivable. 
5. Normalization in P-Prop2
The formal system Prop2 defines a typed λ-calculus by the Curry–Howard isomorphism (see [8]). As a consequence, we
introduce the notion of β-reduction of terms.
The substitution of terms u1, . . . , un for term variables x1, . . . , xn in a term t can be defined in a standard manner by
induction on t . Such a substitution will be written with the same notation already used with formulae. Care must be taken
in case a substitution σ is applied to λxA.t: the resulting formula is λxA.σ · t , but xmust be renamed if x is in the domain of
σ or if x is a free term variable in some of the terms u1, . . . , un.
Similarly, we define the substitution of formulae F1, . . . , Fn for variables α1, . . . , αn in a term t by induction on t . The
substitution is applied on all formulae occurring in t . Here again, we must pay attention if a substitution σ is applied to
Λα.t: the resulting formula isΛα.σ · t , but α must be renamed if α is in the domain of σ or if α is a free variable in at least
one of the formulae F1, . . . , Fn.
There are two kinds of reduction. The first kind of reduction, βλ-reduction, calculates the application of a term on a term:
(λxA.t)u  βλ [x← u] · t
The second kind of reduction, βΛ-reduction, calculates the application of a term on a type:
(Λα.t)U  βΛ [α← U] · t
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From these two applications, the one-step β-reduction, which is denoted as  β , is the union of the two reduction
relations βλ and βΛ . We will write the β-reduction relation, which is the reflexive and transitive closure of β .
The usual second-order λ-calculus has the property of subject reduction: all reduction steps transform a derivation of a
judgement into a derivation of the same judgement. As P-Prop2 is a restriction of Prop2, we only have to prove that each
reduction step applied to a derivable term in P-Prop2 generates a derivable term in P-Prop2: then typedλ-calculus associated
with P-Prop2 has the property of subject reduction.Moreover, it is strongly normalizing since P-Prop2 is a restriction of Prop2.
Expressed in more formal terms, the goal of this section is to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 20. For all derivable judgement Γ `p t : F and for all terms u bearing the property t  u, the judgement Γ `p u : F
is derivable.
Proof. Immediate by iteration of Propositions 22 (see subsection 5.1) and 24 (see subsection 5.2).
5.1. Application of a term on a term
By an immediate induction on the derivations, we observe that a βλ-reduction step applied to the derivation of a
judgement Γ `2 (λxA.t)u : F is the derivation of the judgement Γ `2 [x ← u] · t : F . This is the derivation of the
judgement Γ , x : A `2 t : F in which all the derivations of Γ ,∆, x : A `2 x : A by the rule (Hyp) are replaced by the
derivation of Γ ,∆ `2 u : A. Note that we have to weaken Γ `2 u : Awith the context∆.
Let us consider a derivation of Γ `p (λxA.t)u : F in P-Prop2 in which occurs a derivation of Γ ,∆, x : A `p x : A from
the rule (P-Hyp). The derivation of Γ `p u : A has to be weakened by∆ in order to apply the βλ-reduction. Hence, we only
have to prove that the following weakening rule is valid in P-Prop2:
Γ `p t : F `p σ · U
Γ ,U `p t : F
(P-Weak).
Proposition 21. The rule (P-Weak) holds in P-Prop2.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of Γ `p t : F ; (P-Ax) and (P-Hyp) are the only non-immediate cases and
they are similar:
• `p µ · Γ
Γ `p o : >
(P-Ax): according to Proposition 18, all sub-formulae of the formula in µ · (Γ ,U) are HTM. Using
Proposition 9we derive the judgements`p τµ·Γ and`p τσ ·U . According to Lemma16, the setΓ ∪{U} ismotivable
with the substitution τ :`p Γ> and`p U> are derivable. Consequently, we derive Γ ,U `p o : >with the (P-Ax) rule. 
Then we prove the subject reduction property of βλ-reduction:
Proposition 22. For all derivable judgements Γ `p (λxA.t)u : F , the judgement Γ `p [x← u] · t : F is derivable.
Proof. By definition, the judgements Γ , x : A `p t : F and Γ `p u : A are derivable. Then, we will prove by induction on
the derivation of Γ , x : A `p t : F that if Γ `p u : A is derivable then Γ `p [x← u] · t : F is derivable:
• `p σ · (Γ , x : A)
Γ , x : A `p o : >
(P-Ax): [x← u] · o = o, hence we derive Γ `p [x← u] · o : >with the rule (P-Ax);
• t : F ∈ (Γ , x : A) `p σ · (Γ , x : A)
Γ , x : A `p t : F
(P-Hyp): there are two cases:
– t : F = x : A: by definition, the judgement Γ `p u : A is derivable, and u : A = [x← u] · t : F , so Γ `p [x← u] · t : F
is derivable;
– t : F 6= x : A: we derive Γ `p t : F from the rule (P-Hyp);
•
Γ , x : A, y : B `p f : C
Γ , x : A `p λyB.f : B→ C
(→i): by definition, Γ `p u : A is derivable and according to Proposition 18, the formula B
is HTM, so that we can apply the rule (P-Weak) and, hence, the judgement Γ , y : B `p u : A is derivable. By induction
hypothesis, the judgement Γ , y : B `p [x← u] · f : C is derivable and we derive Γ , y : B `p [x← u] · λyB.f : F with the
rule (→i);
• Γ , x : A `p f : B→ F Γ , x : A `p g : B
Γ , x : A `p fg : F
(→e): by induction hypothesis the judgements Γ `p [x ← u] · f : B → F
and Γ `p [x← u] · g : B are derivable, as a consequence we derive the judgement Γ `p [x← u] · (fg) : F with the rule
(→e);
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• Γ , x : A `p f : B α 6∈ Fv(Γ , x : A)
Γ , x : A `p Λα.f : ∀α.B
(∀i): by induction hypothesis the judgement Γ `p [x← u] · f : B is derivable. As
we can suppose that α does not occur in u, we can derive the judgement Γ `p [x← u] ·Λα.f : F with the rule (∀i);
• Γ , x : A `p f : ∀α.B `p σ · U
Γ , x : A `p fU : [α← U] · B
(P-∀e): by induction hypothesis the judgement Γ `p [x← u] · f : ∀α.B is derivable.
Consequently, we derive the judgement Γ `p [x← u] · (fU) : F with the rule (P-∀e). 
5.2. Application of a term on a type
By an immediate induction on derivations, we observe that a βΛ-reduction step applied to the derivation of a judgement
Γ `2 (Λα.t)U : [α ← U] · F is the derivation of the judgement Γ `2 [α ← U] · t : [α ← U] · F . This is the derivation of
the judgement Γ `2 t : F in which all the occurrences of the variable α are replaced by the formula U .
Let us consider a derivation of Γ `p (Λα.t)U : [α← U] · F in P-Prop2 and a formula A occurring in this derivation. The
formula [α← U] · Amust be HTM in order to apply βΛ-reduction. This requirement is fulfilled according to Lemma 16.
Lemma 23. For all derivable judgements Γ `p t : F , if U is an HTM formula then the judgement [α← U] · Γ `p [α← U] · t :
[α← U] · F is derivable.
Proof. Let µ be the substitution [α← U]. We prove the lemma by induction on the the derivation of Γ `p t : F :
• `p σ · Γ
Γ `p o : >
(P-Ax): we have o = µ · o and > = µ · >; moreover µ · Γ is HTM according to Lemma 16, so that we
derive µ · Γ `p µ · o : µ · >with the rule (P-Ax);
• x : F ∈ Γ `p σ · Γ
Γ `p x : F
(P-Hyp): x = µ ·x andµ ·Γ is HTM according to Lemma 16, hencewe deriveµ ·Γ `p µ ·x : µ ·F
with the rule (P-Hyp);
•
Γ , x : A `p f : B
Γ `p λxA.f : A→ B
(→i): by induction hypothesis, the judgement µ · (Γ , x : A) `p µ · f : µ · B is derivable, then we
can derive µ · Γ `p µ · λxA.f : µ · (A→ B)with the rule (→i);
• Γ `p f : A→ F Γ `p g : A
Γ `p fg : F
(→e): by induction hypothesis, the judgements µ · Γ `p µ · f : µ · (A → F) and
µ · Γ `p µ · g : µ · A are derivable, so that we derive µ · Γ `p µ · (fg) : µ · F with the rule (→e);
• Γ `p f : A β 6∈ Fv(Γ )
Γ `p Λβ.f : ∀β.A
(∀i): by induction hypothesis, the judgement µ · Γ `p µ · f : µ · A is derivable. As we can
suppose that α 6= β , we derive µ · Γ `p µ ·Λβ.f : µ · ∀β.Awith the rule (∀i);
• Γ `p f : ∀β.A `p σ · V
Γ `p fV : [β ← V ] · A
(P-∀e): by induction hypothesis, the judgement µ · Γ `p µ · f : µ · ∀β.A is derivable.
According to Lemma 16, the formula µ · V is HTM. As we suppose α 6= β and α 6∈ Fv(U), we derive µ · Γ `p µ · (fV ) :
µ · ([β ← V ] · A)with the rule (∀i) using the formula µ · V . 
We now prove the subject reduction property of βΛ-reduction:
Proposition 24. For all derivable judgements Γ `p (Λα.t)U : [α← U] · F , the judgement Γ `p [α← U] · t : [α← U] · F is
derivable.
Proof. By definition, the judgement Γ `p t : F is derivable and the formula U is motivable. We derive the judgement
[α ← U] · Γ `p [α ← U] · t : [α ← U] · F using Lemma 23. As α 6∈ Fv(Γ ), we have a derivation of Γ `p [α ← U] · t :
[α← U] · F . 
6. Usefulness in P-Prop2
In pedagogical calculi, like negationless systems, the property of non-nullity of implications is fulfilled. This property
has similarities in the associated pedagogical λ-calculi. In other words, the logical property of being negationless implies a
computational property. We call this property usefulness.
Definition 25. In a derivable judgement` t : A→ B, the term t is useful if there is a substitution σ so that σ ·A is inhabited.
In case ` t : A → B is derivable with A → B a closed formula, the term t is useful when there is a closed term u of type
A. Thus we can apply t to u because the judgement ` tu : B is derivable. In standard second-order λ-calculus, there are
non-useful terms:
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Proposition 26. The term t = λx⊥.x in the judgement `2 t : ⊥ → ⊥ is not useful.
Proof. Prop2 is consistent, so there is no derivable judgement `p u : ⊥. 
On the contrary, all functions in P-Prop2 are useful, as stated by the following theorem:
Theorem 27. For all derivable judgement `p t : A→ B, the type A> is inhabited.
Proof. Immediate using Proposition 18. 
In case Γ `p t : A→ B is derivable, all types in the context Γ> are inhabited according to Proposition 18. As a consequence,
there is a substitution σ for which `p σ · t> : A> → B> is derivable. Hence, σ · t> is useful.
7. CPS translation
In this sectionwe have to introduce the classical second-order propositional calculus. In this calculus, derivables formulas
are types of the terms of the λµ-calculus introduced by M. Parigot in [21].
Definition 28. The terms of the second-order λµ-calculus are defined inductively as follows:
• o is a term;
• λ-variables x, y, z, . . . are terms;
• if x is a λ-variable, A is a formula and t is a term then λxA.t is a term;
• if t and u are terms then tu is a term;
• if α is a propositional variable and t is a term thenΛα.t is a term;
• if t is a term and U is a formula then then tU is a term;
• if a is a µ-variable, A is a formula and t is a term then µaA.t is a term;
• if a is a µ-variable and t is a term then [a].t is a term.
Note that the operator µ is a binding operator as is λ.
Definition 29.
• A λ-declaration is a statement x : A in which x is a λ-variable.
• A λ-context is a finite set of λ-declarations Γ so that for all x : A ∈ Γ and y : B ∈ Γ , if x = y then A = B.
• A µ-declaration is a statement a : A in which a is a µ-variable.
• A µ-context is a finite set of µ-declarations∆ so that for all a : A ∈ ∆ and b : B ∈ ∆, if a = b then A = B.
The syntax of C-Prop2 is given in natural deduction. In these rules, a judgement Γ `c t : A;∆ signifies that the formula
A holds under the λ-context Γ and the µ-context ∆, while t is the term coding the derivation. Note that the type of the
derived term may be empty: in this case judgements are of the form Γ `c t;∆.
Γ `c o : >;∆
(Ax)
Γ , x : A `c x : A;∆
(Hyp)
Γ , x : A `c t : B;∆
Γ `c λxA.t : A→ B;∆
(→i)
Γ `c t : A→ B;∆ Γ `c u : A;∆
Γ `c tu : B;∆
(→e)
Γ `c t : A;∆ α 6∈ Fv(Γ ,∆)
Γ `c Λα.t : ∀α.A;∆
(∀i)
Γ `c t : ∀α.A;∆
Γ `c tU : [α← U] · A;∆
(∀e)
Γ `c t : A; a : A,∆
Γ `c [a]t; a : A,∆
(⊥)
Γ `c t; a : A,∆
Γ `c µaA.t : A;∆
(µ)
We now introduce a translation of C-Prop2 into P-Prop2, based on Plotkin’s call-by-name CPS simulation [22], known
as continuation passing style translation (CPS translation). This translation is a compiling technique used to simplify the
compilation process of higher-order languages. At type level, CPS translation usually corresponds to a logical interpretation
of classical logic into minimal logic akin to Kolmogorov’s negative translation [14]. We will use a technique related to
Friedman’s A-translation (see [5]): this is Kolmogorov’s negative translation, in which absurdity ⊥ is replaced with a
distinguished propositional variable γ . We will use this translation to embed classical second-order propositional logic into
pedagogical second-order propositional logic. One can find in [4] a study of the same CPS translation we use in this work.
For all formulae F and for all variables γ , let us denote⊥γ for the formula (γ → γ )→ γ . The formula F →⊥γ will be
written ¬γ F , and the formula¬γ¬γ F will be written ¬ γ F .
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Definition 30. Let F be a formula and γ be a variable not occurring in F . We define the pseudo negative translation F γ of the
formula F by induction on F :
• >γ = ¬ γ>;
• αγ = ¬ γα;
• (A→ B)γ = ¬ γ (Aγ → Bγ );
• (∀α.A)γ = ¬ γ (∀α.Aγ ).
We define F γ−− to be the unique formula such that F γ = ¬ γ F γ−−, and we will write F γ− for the formula ¬γ F γ−−.
For all λ-contexts Γ = {x1 : A1, . . . , xn : An} we will denote Γ γ for the context {x1 : A1γ , . . . , xn : Anγ } and for all
µ-contexts∆ = {a1 : A1, . . . , an : An}we will denote∆γ− for the context {a1 : A1γ−, . . . , an : Anγ−}.
Definition 31. For all derivable judgements Γ `c t : F;∆ in which F may be empty, we define the CPS translation t of the
term t by induction on the derivation of Γ `c t : F;∆. In this construction, we will use two distinguished variables k andm
not free in t:
•
Γ `c o : >;∆
(Ax): o = λk>γ− .ko;
• x : F ∈ Γ
Γ `c x : F;∆
(Hyp): x = λkFγ− .xk;
•
Γ , x : A `c f : B;∆
Γ `c λxA.t : A→ B;∆
(→i): λxA.f = λk(A→B)γ− .k(λxAγ .f );
• Γ `c f : A→ F;∆ Γ `c g : A;∆
Γ `c fg : F;∆
(→e): fg = λkFγ− .f (λmAγ→Fγ .mgk);
• Γ `c f : A;∆ β 6∈ Fv(Γ ,∆)
Γ `c Λβ.f : ∀β.A;∆
(∀i):Λα.f = λk∀α.Aγ− .k(Λα.f );
• Γ `c f : ∀α.A;∆
Γ `c fU : [α← U] · A;∆
(∀e): fU = λk([α←U]·A)γ− .f (λm∀α.Aγ .mUγ−−k);
•
Γ `c f ; a : A,∆
Γ `c µaA.f : A;∆
(µ): µaA.f = λaAγ− .f ;
• Γ `c f : A; a : A,∆
Γ `c [a]f ; a : A,∆
(⊥): [a]f = λkγ→γ .f ak.
CPS-translation is known to be correct with respect to equality and evaluation. Two terms are equal if and only if their
CPS-translations are. Moreover, evaluation of terms are faithfully simulated by the evaluation of theirs CPS-translations. A
complete study of these properties is beyond the scope of this work. Interested readers can refer to [22], [18], [1] and [4].
Theorem 36 states that the type F of a term t and the type F γ of its CPS-translation t are related by our translation.
Lemma 32. For all formulae F and U, [α← Uγ−−] · F γ = ([α← U] · F)γ holds.
Proof. Immediate by induction on F . 
Lemma 33. Let µ be the substitution [γ ← >]. For all formulae F and for all set Γ of HTM formulae with no occurrence of the
variable γ , the judgement Γ `p µ · F γ is derivable.
Proof. Let us write>′ for the formula (>→ >)→>. We proceed by induction on the formula F :
• F = >: we have µ · >γ = (>→ >′)→>′, and Γ `p (>→ >′)→>′ is easily derivable;
• F = α: we have µ · αγ = (α→>′)→>′, and Γ `p (α→>′)→>′ is easily derivable;
• F = A→ B: by induction hypothesis `p µ · Aγ is derivable. So Γ ∪ {µ · Aγ } is a set of HTM formulae and by induction
hypothesis Γ , µ · Aγ `p µ · Bγ is derivable. Thus, we derive Γ `p µ · (Aγ → Bγ ) with the (→i) rule. According to
Theorem 19, the formula µ · (Aγ → Bγ ) is HTM, and then the judgement Γ `p (µ · (Aγ → Bγ )→ >′)→ >′ is easily
derivable. As (µ · (Aγ → Bγ )→>′)→>′ = µ · (A→ B)γ , Γ `p µ · (A→ B)γ is derivable;
• F = ∀α.A: as we can assume that α 6∈ Fv(Γ ), Γ `p µ · Aγ is derivable by induction hypothesis. Consequently, we
derive Γ `p ∀α.µ · Aγ with the (∀i) rule. As we can suppose that γ 6= α, ∀α.µ · Aγ = µ · (∀α.A)γ holds. Thus,
Γ `p µ · (∀α.A)γ is derivable and the judgement Γ `p (µ · (∀α.Aγ )→>′)→>′ is easily derivable. As (µ · (∀α.Aγ )→
>′)→>′ = µ · (∀α.A)γ , Γ `p µ · (∀α.A)γ is derivable. 
Note that for all formula F , the formula F γ is motivable with the substitution [γ ← >]. Then, for all context Γ , the
context Γ γ is motivable with [γ ←>].
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Lemma 34. Let µ be the substitution [γ ← >]. For all formula F and for all set Γ of HTM formulae with no occurrence of the
variable γ , the judgement Γ `p µ · F γ− is derivable.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 33. 
Lemma 35. For all formulae F and for all sets Γ of HTM formulae with no occurrence of the variable γ , the formula F γ−− is
motivable.
Proof. We proceed by induction on F : when F = > or F = α, F γ−− is easily motivable.The other cases are straightforward
with Lemma 33. 
Theorem 36. For all judgements Γ `c t : F;∆ derivable in C-Prop2:
• if the type F is not empty then the judgement Γ γ ,∆γ− `p t : F γ is derivable in P-Prop2;
• if the type F is empty then the judgement Γ γ ,∆γ− `p t : ⊥γ is derivable in P-Prop2.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the derivation of Γ `2 t : F :
•
Γ `c o : >;∆
(Ax):
(1) `p [γ ←>] · Γ γ using Lemma 33
(2) `p [γ ←>] · (∆γ−,>γ−) using Lemma 34
(3) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : >γ− `p k : >γ− using (P-Hyp) and (1) (2)
(4) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : >γ− `p o : > using (P-Ax) and (1) (2)
(5) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : >γ− `p ko : γ using (→e) and (3) (4)
(6) Γ γ ,∆γ− `p λk>γ− .ko : >γ using (→i) and (5)
Then the judgement Γ γ ,∆γ− `p o : >γ is derivable.
• x : F ∈ Γ
Γ `c x : F;∆
(Hyp):
(1) `p [γ ←>] · Γ γ using Lemma 33
(2) `p [γ ←>] · (∆γ−, F γ−) using Lemma 34
(3) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ− `p k : F γ− using (P-Hyp) and (1) (2)
(4) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ− `p x : F γ using (P-Hyp) and (1) (2)
(5) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ− `p xk : γ using (→e) and (3) (4)
(6) Γ γ ,∆γ− `p λkFγ− .xk : F γ using (→i) and (5)
Then the judgement Γ γ ,∆γ− `p x : F γ is derivable.
•
Γ , x : A `c f : B;∆
Γ `c λxA.f : A→ B;∆
(→i):
(1) `p [γ ←>] · (Γ γ , Aγ ) using Lemma 33
(2) `p [γ ←>] · (∆γ−, (A→ B)γ−) using Lemma 34
(3) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : (A→ B)γ− `p k : (A→ B)γ− using (P-Hyp) and (1) (2)
(4) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : (A→ B)γ−, x : Aγ `p f : Bγ using induction hypothesis and (P-Weak)
(5) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : (A→ B)γ− `p λxAγ .f : (A→ B)γ−− using (→i) and (4)
(6) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : (A→ B)γ− `p k(λxAγ .f ) : γ using (→e) and (3) (5)
(7) Γ γ ,∆γ− `p λk(A→B)γ− .k(λx(A→B)γ−− .f ) : (A→ B)γ using (→i) and (6)
Then the judgement Γ γ ,∆γ− `p λxA.f : F γ is derivable.
• Γ `c f : A→ F;∆ Γ `c g : A;∆
Γ `c fg : F;∆
(→e):
(1) `p [γ ←>] · Γ γ using Lemma 33
(2) `p [γ ←>] · (∆γ−, F γ−) using Lemma 34
(3) `p [γ ←>] · (Aγ → F γ ) using Lemma 35
(4) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ− `p f : (A→ F)γ using induction hypothesis and (P-Weak)
(5) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ−,m : Aγ → F γ `p m : Aγ → F γ using (P-Hyp) and (1) (2) (3)
(6) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ−,m : Aγ → F γ `p g : Aγ by induction hypothesis and (P-Weak)
(7) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ−,m : Aγ → F γ `p mg : F γ using (→e) and (5) (6)
(8) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ−,m : Aγ → F γ `p k : F γ− using (P-Hyp) and (1) (2) (3)
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(9) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ−,m : Aγ → F γ `p mgk : γ using (→e) and (7) (8)
(10)Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ− `p λmAγ→Fγ .mgk : (A→ F)γ− using (→i) and (9)
(11)Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ− `p f (λmAγ→Fγ .mgk) : γ using (→e) and (4) (10)
(12)Γ γ ,∆γ− `p λkFγ− .f (λmAγ→Fγ .mgk) : F γ using (→i) and (11)
Then the judgement Γ γ ,∆γ− `p fg : F γ is derivable.
• Γ `c f : A;∆ β 6∈ Fv(Γ ,∆)
Γ `c Λβ.f : ∀β.A;∆
(∀i):
(1) `p [γ ←>] · Γ γ using Lemma 33
(2) `p [γ ←>] · (∆γ−, (∀α.A)γ−) using Lemma 34
(3) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : (∀α.A)γ− `p k : ∀α.Aγ− using (P-Hyp) and (1) (2)
(4) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : (∀α.A)γ− `p f : Aγ by induction hypothesis and using (P-Weak)
(5) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : (∀α.A)γ− `p Λα.f : (∀α.A)γ−− using (∀i) and (4)
(6) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : (∀α.A)γ− `p k(Λα.f ) : γ using (→e) and (3) (5)
(7) Γ γ ,∆γ− `p λk(∀α.A)γ− .k(Λα.f ) : (∀α.A)γ using (→i) and (6)
Then the judgement Γ γ ,∆γ− `p Λα.f : (∀α.A)γ is derivable.
• Γ `c f : ∀α.A;∆
Γ `c fU : [β ← U] · A;∆
(∀e):
(1) `p [γ ←>] · Γ γ using Lemma 33
(2) `p [γ ←>] · (∆γ−, F γ−) using Lemma 34
(3) `p [γ ←>] · (∀α.Aγ ) using Lemma 35
(4) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ− `p f : (∀α.A)γ using induction hypothesis and (P-Weak)
(5) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ−,m : ∀α.Aγ `p m : ∀α.Aγ using (P-Hyp) and (1) (2) (3)
(6) `p [γ ←>] · Uγ−− using Lemma 35
(7) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ−,m : ∀α.Aγ `p mUγ−− : F γ using (∀e) and 5) 6) and Lemma 32
(8) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ−,m : ∀α.Aγ `p k : F γ− using (P-Hyp) and (1) (2) (3)
(9) Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ−,m : ∀α.Aγ `p mUγ−−k : γ using (→e) and (7) (8)
(10)Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ− `p λm∀α.Aγ .mUγ−−k : (∀α.A)γ− using (→i) and (9)
(11)Γ γ ,∆γ−, k : F γ− `p f (λmAγ→Fγ .mUγ−−k) : γ using (→e) and (4) (10)
(12)Γ γ ,∆γ− `p λkFγ− .f (λmAγ→Fγ .mUγ−−k) : F γ using (→i) and (11)
Then the judgement Γ γ ,∆γ− `p fU : ([α← U] · A)γ is derivable.
•
Γ `c f ; a : A,∆
Γ `c µaA.f : A;∆
(µ):
(1) Γ γ ,∆γ−, a : Aγ− `p f : ⊥γ using induction hypothesis
(2) Γ γ `p λaAγ− .f : Aγ using (→i) and (1)
Then the judgement Γ γ ,∆γ− `p µaA.f : Aγ is derivable.
• Γ `c f : A; a : A,∆
Γ `c [a]f ; a : A,∆
(⊥):
(1) `p [γ ←>] · Γ γ using Lemma 33
(2) `p [γ ←>] · (∆γ−, Aγ−) using Lemma 34
(3) `p [γ ←>] · (γ → γ ) immediate
(4) Γ γ ,∆γ−, a : Aγ−, k : γ → γ `p f : Aγ using induction hypothesis and (P-Weak)
(5) Γ γ ,∆γ−, a : Aγ−, k : γ → γ `p δ : Aγ− using (P-Ax) and (1) (2) (3)
(6) Γ γ ,∆γ−, a : Aγ−, k : γ → γ `p f δ : ⊥γ using (→e) and (4) (5)
(7) Γ γ ,∆γ−, a : Aγ−, k : γ → γ `p k : γ → γ using (P-Ax) and (1) (2) (3)
(8) Γ γ ,∆γ−, a : Aγ−, k : γ → γ `p f δk : γ using (→e) and (6) (7)
(9) Γ γ ,∆γ−, a : Aγ− `p λkγ→γ .f δk : ⊥γ using (→i) and (8)
Then the judgement Γ γ ,∆γ−, a : Aγ− `p λkγ→γ .f δk : ⊥γ is derivable.
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When the context is empty, we can successively apply the rule (∀i) to obtain a closed term. For all formulae F , the formula
∀γ .F γ is denoted as F ?. Note that for all formulae F , Fv(F ?) = Fv(F) holds. In other words, if we have a derivation of the
judgement`c t : F , a derivation of the judgement`p Λγ .t : F ? can readily be obtained. Moreover, if we have a derivation of
`p u : [γ ← U] ·Aγ → U , we can derive`p (Λγ .t)Uu : U . In case γ 6∈ Fv(A)we have a derivation of`p (Λγ .t)A(λxA.x) : A.
The evaluation of a program is usually represented by the evaluation of its CPS-translation applied to the empty
continuation λxA.x. When CPS-translation is typed with a negative translation, the empty continuation must have type
A → ⊥, so it cannot be well-typed in case A is a valid formula. When we type CPS-translations with a γ -translation, we
have seen that we can type the empty continuation λxA.x in case γ 6∈ Fv(A). This observation had already been pointed out
by Friedman [5] in order to prove that Peano arithmetic is a conservative extension of Heyting arithmetic forΠ02 formulas.
8. Conclusion
We have presented a simple propositional calculus which fulfills the properties of negationless systems and induces
a typed λ-calculus in which all functions are useful. Formal systems do not leave programmers free to write incorrect
programs, which is undesirable. Similarly, pedagogical formal systems do not allow one to write useless programs, which
are not needed. Finally, we have proved that pedagogical second-order λ-calculus is as powerful as the second-order λµ-
calculus via a CPS translation. Of course, one can ask if pedagogical constraints can be used conveniently with higher-order
calculi and calculi with dependent types.
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